This paper examines the consequences of capital and labor subsidies for employment, capital formation and other macroeconomic variables within an OLG small open economy model of wealth accumulation. Two cases, the neoclassical-equilibrium one and the modern-equilibrium one, have been analyzed. We discover that the employment effects of the subsidies studied differ significatively, while whether the subsidy hike is financed by an increase of payroll taxation or a decrease of employment subsidization is immaterial for the qualitative effects on the macroeconomic system. In the neoclassical-equilibrium theory, a capital subsidy causes a temporary increase in hours worked which vanishes in the new long-run, while an increase in labor subsidy has no aggregative effects on the macroeconomic equilibrium. The key finding of the modern-equilibrium case is the existence of a negative relationship between capital formation and employment. Capital subsidies boost investment and aggravate unemployment, while labor subsidies stimulate employment and may depress capital accumulation.
Introduction
The persistence of high structural unemployment rates in many industrial economies has been the source of increasing attention and concern among public opinion, scholars and policy-makers during the last years. Hence the identification and adoption of proper therapies to cut unemployment are widely felt to be a necessity. At the same time, there is also a widespread concern about the poor investment performance of many western countries.
Policy measures to reduce unemployment that focus on the labor market are sometime supposed to have positive effects on capital accumulation; policies of this type are the reduction of taxes on labor or the introduction of labor subsidies. See Tullio (1987) , Begg-Portes (1993) , Drèze-Malinvaud (1994) , and Daveri-Tabellini (1997) .
Other scholars suggest that rather than adopt measures that impact only/mainly on the labor market it would be better to implement policies to enhance capital formation, and thus raise labor productivity, which they presume would increase employment. See, for example, Drèze-Bean (1990) , Rowthorn (1995) , and Snower (1997) . A typical action of this sort is the introduction of subsidies on capital or investment as means to stimulate capital accumulation. Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1987, chapter 9) , for example, discover in a numerical intertemporal equilibrium model with finite-lived Samuelson-Diamond agents that investment incentives in a closed economy increase labor temporarily though leaving it unchanged in the long-run. Sen-Turnovsky (1990) show that in a small open economy model with a representative infinite-lived household the introduction of a permanent investment tax credit though initially reducing employment, leads to higher employment in the steady-state equilibrium. The common feature of studies on capital subsidies is that they consider a neoclassical labor market, where positive equilibrium unemployment is absent. The consequences of investment-promoting policies on equilibrium unemployment have received very little specific attention within a proper theoretical framework.
The purpose of this paper is to compare the consequences for employment and capital formation of balanced-budget capital and labor subsidies in an OLG model of wealth accumulation and exogenous growth in a small open economy. Two cases are considered for the labor market: the neoclassical-equilibrium theory, where changes in labor determined by the shock depend on variation in hours worked and not in the unemployment rate which is absent, and the modern-equilibrium theory, characterized by the existence of a positive structural rate of unemployment due to efficiency wage considerations of the shirking type.
Particular attention is devoted to problems of financing the policy shifts that can neutralize the expansionary effect of inputs stimuli when there is simultaneously a compensatory adjustment of distortionary taxes/subsidies that hinge on the labor market.
We discover that in the neoclassical analysis capital subsidies spur capital formation, but exerts only temporary positive effects on manhours supplied; labor subsidy is neutral for the macroeconomic equilibrium, both in the short and long-run.
The key finding under a generalized real-wage rigidity is the existence of a negative relationship between capital formation and employment. It appears that factor incentives increase the subsidized factor, but may diminish the non-subsidized factor. Therefore capital subsidies boost investment and can aggravate unemployment, while labor subsidies stimulate employment and may depress capital accumulation. The financing regime of the policy shocks plays no qualitative role for the macroeconomic equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the neoclassical model and analyzes the long-run and comparative dynamics effects of capital and labor subsidies hikes.
Section 3 presents the modern-equilibrium model and investigates the macroeconomic implications of balanced-budget factors incentives. Section 4 concludes.
The neoclassical-equilibrium case

The model
Consider a nonmonetary small open economy that produces a single tradable good, which is perfectly substitutable with the foreign-produced good. Domestic production is obtained by using capital and labor. There are only two assets in the economy: real capital and net foreign assets. The economy is populated by three sectors: finite-lived consumers, competitive firms and the government. Time is continuous and agents are endowed with perfect foresight.
The behavior of consumers is derived by adopting the OLG approach of Blanchard (1985) with no intergenerational bequest motive and an endogenous labor-leisure choice, as in Kanaginis-Phelps (1994) and Phelps (1994, chapter 16) . All consumers are identical and face uncertainty on the duration of their lives, since a constant probability of death θ is assumed. In every instant of time a large new cohort, whose size is normalized to one, is born. The population, composed of cohorts of different ages, is constant, as the birth rate is assumed to equal the death rate.
Assuming that individual utility is logarithmic in consumption of the good, c, and leisure, l l − (where l is the time endownment and l is the labor supply), at each instant t a consumer born at time s t ≤ solves the following problem
subject to the instantaneous budget constraint
and the solvency condition precluding Ponzi schemes
where w=nonhuman wealth; r h =real interest rate faced by households; v h =hourly real wage; and ρ =rate of time preference (exogenous).
The optimal conditions for the individual problem (1)
where h s t ( , ) represents consumer's human wealth, given by
Aggregating over all the cohorts and omitting the time index, the demand side of the model can be expressed as
where capital letters denote aggregate variables of the corresponding individual variables.
From system (4), the Blanchard-Yaari dynamic equation for aggregate consumption can be easily derived
Individual nonhuman wealth consists of real capital and the stock of net foreign assets. In aggregate terms, we have
where K is physical capital stock and F is the stock of net foreign assets.
The production side of the economy is populated by many identical firms operating in a competitive environment in the output and factor markets. Domestic output, Z, is produced by using capital and labor as inputs. The production function has positive, but diminishing, marginal physical products of inputs, and is linearly homogeneous in its
where g(k) is the output per manhour and k K L ≡ is the capital-manhour ratio. For simplicity, we assume that capital stock does not depreciate and capital accumulation does not involve adjustment costs.
The first order conditions for maximum profit entail
where r f represents the cost of capital and v f is the hourly labor cost, both after taxes and subsidies. Factor prices faced by firms are defined as The government keeps the budget balanced. Therefore its instantaneous budget constraint is
where ω represents the fixed per hours government purchases. Our analysis will consider the macroeconomic effects of exogenous changes in either s The current account is given by the the trade balance, equal to the excess of production over absorption, plus the interest income earned on foreign bond holdings
As foreign assets are perfectly tradable at world level, the interest rate available to households, r h , is equal to the given world interest rate, r
The full model of the economy is obtained combining the optimality conditions for consumers, firms and the equations of accumulation. The basic structure of the economy can be expressed as: In order to analyze the dynamic properties of model (11), linearize equations (11a), (11b) and (11d) around the long-run equilibrium, and solve for C; we obtain the following implicit semi-reduced form
Therefore substituting equation (12) into the equation of motion of nonhuman wealth for C and using (11d) yields The equation of the saddle-path SS is
where η 1 <0 denotes the stable eigenvalue of the matrix of the coefficients in (13). Equation 
Comparative statics and dynamics
The analysis studies the following policy shifts: an increase in s The determinant of the state matrix in (13) is
Consider the long-run, when all the dynamic variables remain constant through time.
The capital subsidies hike results in an increase in the capital-labor ratio -namely
> 1 0 -since it reduces the after-tax and subsidy cost of capital for firms, r f , and the marginal product of capital is diminishing in capital intensity.
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The implications of the shock on manhours can be analyzed employing the labor supply and capital market equilibrium schedules, as in Hoon-Phelps (1996) . The stock of (11f)-together with relationships (11d) and (4a) yields the following labor-supply function
Equation (15) gives the steady-state labor supply of finite-lived consumers in terms of the ratio of wage to cash-flow from wealth. According to equation (15) Furthermore, using the long-run Blanchard-Yaari "modified golden rule" together with the consumption function (4a) and the expression for H , we obtain the relation Since both equations (15) and (16) are independent of the capital subsidy and the payroll tax rate, any change in the capital incentive under the current financing regime leaves hours worked and the wage-nonwage-income ratio unchanged. However, the stimulus to capital boosts gross domestic product, because domestic capital is increased with the increase in capital intensity; in the special case 
, is ambiguous, as it depends on whether the capital's before-tax 6 Equation (16) is a long-run arbitrage condition; it can be written as
. This equation asserts that the rate of return on wealth must equal the rate of return on consumption, given by the discount rate plus a premium proportional to the ratio of income from wealth to income from labor.
marginal product (g') is above or below the world interest rate (r 
Consider now the comparative dynamics of the model. The analysis of the short-run adjustment studies only a permanent unanticipated fiscal disturbance. As a rise in s K results in a long-run increase of the hourly wage, consumption and income from wealth, the unexpected permanent shock shifts the saddle-path upward to S'S ', 8 leading to a short-run increase of labor (despite the long-run invariance), which overshoots its long-run equilibrium value (see Figure 1) . The equilibrium moves suddenly from point E 0 to point E' 0 on the new saddle-path. Since leisure diminishes less than the household wage is increased, an initial jump of consumption occurs as well. The capital stock also jumps up in response to the jump in capital intensity and to the increase in hours worked, provided we suppose for simplicity that physical capital is instantaneously and costlessly mobile across borders.
After the shock has taken place, the system, placed on the new stable arm S'S', converges monotonically to the long-run equilibrium with a reduction in labor (necessary to restore the initial equilibrium value) and an incipient accumulation of wealth, which increases the cash-flow from wealth.
When the capital stimulus brings about a long-run drop in household wage, consumption and income from wealth, i.e. τ K r * < s K , the economic system follows an opposite adjustment process, driven by an impact reduction of manhours and consumption.
In this case, it is worth observing that labor increases along the convergence toward the new long-run equilibrium.
ii) increase in s The endogenous adjustment of s L required to support a given increase of s
. If taxation of physical capital is relatively high compared to capital subsidy, as assumed, the employment subsidy could increase (instead of diminish) as a result of the higher capital subsidy, because the revenue effect of capital taxation could be quite robust.
The model
The neoclassical model gives no insight regarding the consequences of fiscal incentives for capital formation or labor use on unemployed workers, since it does not provide an explanation of equilibrium unemployment. Changes in the labor input are only due to variations of hours worked and wages adjust to equate labor supply and demand. In order to investigate the implications of subsidies on the natural rate of unemployment and its time path, we use the incentive or efficiency wage theory, based on the assumption of the shirking behavior of workers begun by Calvo (1979) and Solow (1979) . The employees' effort is imperfectly monitored by firms and requires some costs in order to be observed; it is then optimal for firms to set wages above the competitive level to raise the cost of being fired for workers, this stimulating their effort and reducing firms' costs of monitoring.
The model below is a one-sector version of the (two-sector) model in Phelps (1994, chapter 9) , in which the role of wealth and asset prices are at center-stage.
The production function is
where G satisfies the usual neoclassical properties of regularity and is constant returns to scale, ε 
where z is the expected income obtainable elsewhere if the worker is fired, v i h gives the wage per employee paid in the i-th firm and y W is the average nonwage income of workers, taken as ratio to the worker population (whose size is unity).
In this context, firms are wage setters. Assuming that the optimal behavior of all firms is identical, so that we can omit the superscript i, the first order conditions for the maximum profit are
By following Calvo (1979) and Salop (1979) , we can set z Nv h = -where N also represents the employment rate, since the population has been normalized to one.
Combining equations (19b) and (19c) and using the Calvo-Salop indicator for z, we
According to condition (19d) the sum of the partial elasticities of the effort function, taken in absolute value, must be greater than one at the optimum. The hypothesis s L >0, assuring that the sum of the partial elasticities is greater than one, is crucial in order to have the effects of subsidies and taxes on the incentive-wage equation and therefore on the whole macroeconomic equilibrium.
The government budget constraint is given by
where ω represents the fixed public spending-employment ratio.
The rest of the model is the same as in the neoclassical-equilibrium case. The substantial difference from the previous model is that now L is replaced with N.
The investigation of the short-run adjustment requires the discussion of the dynamic properties of the model. As shown in the Appendix, the modern-equilibrium model exhibits saddle-point stability under any financing regime considered. This function is depicted in fig. 3 e labelled BY.
Steady-state and transitional dynamics
The wage-setting condition must be expressed in a convenient way. By substituting
into equation (19c), the optimal condition for wage can be expressed as 
Expressions for the partial derivatives of this function are reported in the Appendix.
The incentive-wage equation ( The system shows a saddle-path behavior, characterized by the instantaneous jump of employment, wage and consumption and lagged adjustment of the predetermined variables.
It is not difficult to show that no perverse-shootings occur.
iii) increase in s K financed through a reduction in s L In this case it is convenient for the aim of simplifying the analysis to find an expression for the incentive-wage that is independent of s L . By substituting the government budget constraint into (19b) and using (19a), the wage-setting condition becomes
This equation may be solved for Ñ , using the reduced-form
where the partial derivatives are given in the Appendix. Equation (21b) However it is not difficult to show that now the steady-state multipliers taken in absolute 15 Equations (21a) and (21b) characterize the incentive-wage with different emphasis on fiscal subsidy/tax rates. The main difference is that equation (21a) is based on the optimal conditions for employment and wage, while equation (21b) includes the government budget constraint and the optimal condition for capital and wage. 16 Note that in principle the effect of s K on the wage-to-income-from-wealth ratio is unclear, namely the sign of Φ 2 is ambiguous, because the rise in capital subsidy could result in an increase in public revenues due to capital taxation that overwhelms the corresponding increase in public expenditures for investment subsidy. Therefore an increase in employment subsidy rather than a decrease could happen, if the revenue effect from capital taxation is strong enough. If we impose the mild restriction that prevents this perverse effect from
, then Φ 2 will be unambiguously negative.
value are bigger than those in case i), as the channels of trasmission of the shock are reinforced by the reduction of the employment subsidy.
Concluding remarks
The paper has examined the consequences of capital and labor subsidies for employment, capital formation and other macroeconomic variables within a nonmonetary small open economy model of wealth accumulation with new generations. Two cases, the neoclassical-equilibrium one and the modern-equilibrium one, have been analyzed. We discovered that the employment effects of the subsidies studied differ significatively from the case analyzed and the type of subsidy, while the financing procedure is immaterial for the qualitative effects on the macroeconomic system.
In the neoclassical-equilibrium theory, a capital subsidy at first causes an increase in hours worked which is eroded and vanishes along the transition to the new long-run equilibrium, provided that taxation of capital was and remains higher than capital subsidies.
In this case national income, consumption, output and capital stock are all increased by the
shock. An increase in labor subsidy has no effects on the macroeconomic equilibrium.
Within the modern-equilibrium theory, a capital subsidy, financed by either an It is not new to find that, when labor finances its own subsidy, the gain of employment achieved by the subsidy lowers the wage; proposals for low-wage subsidies envision financing by all wage earners, so low wages may be pulled up alongside employment. What is new here is that employment subsidies may reduce output and capital stock, while capital subsidies may reduce employment. 
I. Partial derivatives of the incentive-wage functions
Equation (21a) Equations (22a) and (22b) give the equilibrium unemployment and wage as function of income from wealth and fiscal parameters, respectively.
By substituting equations (22) into the equation of motion of income from wealth, i.e. the consumers budget constraint, and linearizing around the long-run equilibrium, we get: 
